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ARTICLE

The Compensation Trap:
The Limits of Community-Based Pollution
Regulation in China
BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, ANNA LORA WAINWRIGHT, YUNMEI WU, &
YIYUN (AMY) ZHANG*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Pollution Regulation in Emerging Markets
The control of environmental risks increasingly demands
effective regulation in “industrializing countries” such as India,
Brazil, and China. The global integration, economic growth,
agricultural
commercialization,
urbanization,
and
industrialization of these countries have shifted the worst
environmental hazards from the industrialized to the
industrializing world. Consider, for example, the daunting scale
of pollution in China; according to recent estimates, it causes
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750,000 premature deaths annually.1 About 300 million Chinese
people drink contaminated water on a daily basis, and 190 million
of them suffer from related illnesses.2 Moreover, sixteen of the
world’s twenty most polluted cities are in China.3 Neighbors
including Russia, South Korea, and Japan have long suffered
from China’s pollution, which increasingly influences more
distant regions. A striking example is that on some days,
according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
twenty-five percent of suspended air particulates in Los Angeles
originate from the People’s Republic.4 China also became a
dominant factor in global climate change when it surpassed the
U.S. in 2006 as the world’s number one producer of greenhouse
gases.5
To control environmental risks, industrialized countries that
are part of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) have applied a combination of regulatory
instruments but with mixed success. Direct legal instruments, in
which a government sets standards and issues permits to
polluting facilities, dominated the early regulatory landscape.6 In
later years, economic market-based instruments, such as
discharge fees, pollution taxes, and emissions trading systems,

1. Richard McGregor, 750,000 a Year Killed by Chinese Pollution, FIN.
TIMES (July 2, 2007), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f40e248-28c7-11dc-af78000b5df10621.html. See generally WORLD BANK & STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN.,
COSTS OF POLLUTION IN CHINA: ECONOMIC ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL DAMAGES
(2007),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/ Resources/China_Cost_of_Pollution.pdf.
2. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ENVIRONMENTAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW: CHINA 239 (2007) [hereinafter OECD PERFORMANCE
REVIEW],
available
at
http://www.efchina.org/csepupfiles/report/
200812095029729.8523773582758.pdf/Environmental%20Performance%20Revie
w%20-%20China%2007-23-07.pdf.
3. Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China's
Environmental Crisis, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 38, 40 (2007).
4. Id. at 44.
5. China Now No. 1 in CO2 Emissions; USA in Second Position, PBL NETH.
ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/
moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition (last visited Mar.
18, 2012).
6. See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET
AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
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were incorporated into regulatory frameworks.7 In addition to
mandatory approaches, OECD countries have also experimented
with a wide range of voluntary or semi-voluntary programs, such
as certification and public disclosure, as well as quasi-voluntary
methods, such as environmental covenants and governmentIndustrializing
sponsored self-regulatory mechanisms.8
countries, which are not a part of the OECD, have copied these
regulatory instruments, but effective implementation has been
difficult, leaving national and global risks under-regulated.9
A limited law enforcement capacity and low levels of
compliance are factors that explain why environmental
regulation in industrializing countries has been inadequate.10

7. See generally ALBERT WEALE, THE NEW POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1992);
TOM H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2006).
8. See, e.g., REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer
Nash eds., 2001); GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., DARA O'ROURKE, COMMUNITY-DRIVEN REGULATION: BALANCING
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM (2004); LESLEY K. MCALLISTER,
MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN
BRAZIL (2008); Adriaan Bedner, Consequences of Decentralization:
Environmental Impact Assessment and Water Pollution Control in Indonesia, 32
LAW & POL’Y 38 (2010); ALLEN BLACKMAN, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION
PAPER 00-02-REV, INFORMAL SECTOR POLLUTION CONTROL: WHAT POLICY OPTIONS
DO WE HAVE? (2000), available at http://www.jac-ccc.org/PDN-ARP/RFF/
BLACKMAN.PDF; ALLEN BLACKMAN, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION PAPER
05-31, COLOMBIA'S DISCHARGE FEE PROGRAM: INCENTIVES FOR POLLUTERS OR
REGULATORS? (2005), available at http://www.mamacoca.org/docs_de_base/
Fumigas/rff-dp-05-31.pdf; Allen Blackman, Introduction: Small Firms and the
Environment in Developing Countries, in SMALL FIRMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COLLECTIVE IMPACTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (Allen
Blackman ed., RFF Press 2006) [hereinafter Blackman, Small Firms]; Benjamin
van Rooij & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, A Fragile Convergence: Understanding
Variation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial Pollution Law, 32 LAW &
POL’Y 14 (2010); David Stuligross, The Political Economy of Environmental
Regulation in India, 72 PAC. AFF. 392 (1999).
10. See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(2005); Blackman, Small Firms, supra note 9; WORLD BANK, GREENING
INDUSTRY: NEW ROLES FOR COMMUNITIES, MARKETS AND GOVERNMENTS (2000),
available
at
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=
64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID
=000094946_9911240530591; van Rooij & Lo, supra note 9; O'ROURKE, supra
note 9; Lesley McAllister et al., Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement
in Industrializing Countries, 32 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2010); MCALLISTER, supra note
9.
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China serves as an example; in many fields of regulation,
including arable land protection,11 pollution,12 food safety,13
mining,14 intellectual property rights,15 and labor,16 enforcement
has been weak and violations widespread. Low compliance and
weak enforcement are mutually reinforcing, creating a vicious
circle that undermines the implementation of any regulatory
instrument, be it legal, economic, or voluntary.17 Such vicious
circles are often embedded in and facilitated by a governance
structure that is susceptible to the capture of state regulatory

11. See BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA:
LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY AND CASES (2006),
available
at
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/5433/
Thesis.pdf?sequence=1%20.
12. See XIAOYING MA & LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN
CHINA 182 (2000); ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT PRACTICES AND WAYS FORWARD 34 (2006); Bryan Tilt, The Political
Ecology of Pollution Enforcement in China: A Case from Sichuan's Rural
Industrial Sector, 192 CHINA Q. 915 (2007); VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11; OECD
PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 2.
13. See WORLD BANK, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH FOOD SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
FOR FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, PROMOTING FOOD SAFETY, COMPETITIVENESS, AND
POVERTY REDUCTION (2007), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSite
PK=523679&entityID=000310607_20070802162742; Aleda V. Roth et al.,
Unraveling the Food Supply Chain: Strategic Insights from China and the 2007
Recalls, 44 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 22 (2008); David Barboza, In Food Safety
Crackdown, China Closes 180 Plants, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/asia/27cndChina.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=David%20Barboza,%20In%20Food%20Safety%20C
rackdown,%20China%20Closes%20180%20Plants,%20N.Y.%20TIMES,%20June
%2027%202007&st=cse.
14. See Tim Wright, The Political Economy of Coal Mine Disasters in China:
“Your Rice Bowl or Your Life", 179 CHINA Q. 629 (2004).
15. See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2005).
16. See Sean Cooney, China's Labour Law, Compliance and Flaws in
Implementing Institutions, 49 J. INDUS. REL. 673 (2007); Sean Cooney, Making
Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the
People's Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050 (2007).
17. See generally Gjalt Huppes & Robert A. Kagan, Market-Oriented
Regulation of Environmental Problems in the Netherlands, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 215
(1989); Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond
False Dichotomies, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 529 (1997).
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institutions by business elites.18 Several factors, including the
unclear demarcation between state and market institutions,19 the
state’s lack of steering and coordinating capacity,20 and the
dominance of informal networks over formal legal structures21
can foster this capture.
To deal with the increasingly worrying levels of pollution
from industrializing countries, we need to understand how
regulatory instruments can be effective when there is a vicious
circle of low compliance and weak enforcement occurring in
capture-prone governance contexts.
This necessitates a
reorientation of regulatory theory, shifting the focus from
industrialized to industrializing countries, concentrating on how
regulation functions and how it can be improved when compliance
levels and enforcement capacity are low, and studying regulatory
design and implementation in governance settings where
business and regulators are closely aligned.22
B. Citizen-Based Pollution Regulation as a Solution?
One idea23 for breaking through the regulatory deadlock that
so often exists in industrializing countries is to expand the
18. See Clifford Russell & William Vaughan, The Choice of Pollution Control
Policy Instruments in Developing Countries: Arguments, Evidence and
Suggestions, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND
RESOURCE ECONOMICS 2003/2004 (Henk Folmer & Tom Tietenberg eds., 2003).
19. See, e.g., TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA (1st ed. 2001);
RICHARD ROBISON & VEDI HADIZ, REORGANISING POWER IN INDONESIA: THE
POLITICS OF OLIGARCHY IN AN AGE OF MARKETS (2004); Susanna B. Hecht,
Soybeans, Development and Conservation on the Amazon Frontier, 36 DEV. &
CHANGE 375 (2005).
20. See Henk Schulte Nordholt, Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency
and Identity in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, 159 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE TAAL-, LAND- EN
VOLKENKUNDE 550, 570 (2003); Andrew C. Mertha, China's "Soft"
Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA Q. 791, 792
(2005); see also MCALLISTER, supra note 9.
21. See Tim Lindsey, The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New
Indonesia, in INDONESIA TODAY: CHALLENGES OF HIST. (Grayson J. Lloyd &
Shannon L. Smith eds., 2001); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, The Resilience of Guanxi
and Its New Deployments: A Critique of Some New Guanxi Scholarship, 170
CHINA Q. 459, 465 (2002); see also KATHRYN HOCHSTETLER & MARGARET E. KECK,
GREENING BRAZIL: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM IN STATE AND SOCIETY (2007).
22. See McAllister et al., supra note 10.
23. Another idea is the introduction of market-based instruments.
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regulatory space for non-state actors such as consumers, NGOs,
and local communities.24 By involving these non-state actors,
less state capacity is needed and capture-type state-business
relations can be circumvented through the force of a relatively
independent civil society. Citizen complaints can add inspection
capacity to aid state regulators. Citizens can oversee captured
state regulators and pressure them into action through legal and
political means. They can also help to enhance the legitimacy for
environmental regulation and support weak environmental
regulators. Citizens can directly act as regulators by exerting
pressure on polluting firms through legal or political means.
That said, we know from the broader literature that communitybased pollution regulation is not a panacea and it requires certain
conditions to be successful. We know that the higher the income,
the level of awareness, the independency of local industry, and
the capacity for organization and leadership, the more likely
citizen efforts are to succeed.25 Furthermore, we know that
successful community regulation requires support from state and
civil society organizations.26
These attributes may be
particularly lacking in rural communities located in rapidly
developing and industrializing countries of the South, and thus,
the promise of community regulation may go unfulfilled.
24. See Blackman, Small Firms, supra note 9, at 1; O'ROURKE, supra note 9,
at 6, 14; NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION,
AND ENVIRONMENT 53-153 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003); Bridget M. Hutter &
Clive J. Jones, From Government to Governance: External Influences on Business
Risk Management, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 32-36 (2007); Neil Gunningham,
Regulating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, 14 J. ENVTL. L. 3-32 (2002).
See generally BRIDGET M. HUTTER, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF RISK & REG., ECON. &
SOC. RES. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN REGULATION (2006),
available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36118/1/Disspaper37.pdf; BRIDGET M.
HUTTER & JOAN O'MAHONY, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS OF RISK & REG., ECON. & SOC.
RES. COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN REGULATING
BUSINESS (2004), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/
units/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper26.pdf; SHAKEB AFSAH ET AL., RES. FOR THE
FUTURE, HOW DO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONTROL PROGRAMS WORK? EVIDENCE FROM
INDONESIA (2000), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-0044.pdf.
25. Benjamin van Rooij, The People Vs. Pollution: Understanding Citizen
Action Against Pollution in China, 19 J. CONTEM. CHINA 55, 63-65 (2010).
26. See generally O'ROURKE, supra note 9; Benjamin van Rooij, Greening
Industry Without Enforcement? An Assessment of the World Bank's Pollution
Regulation Model for Developing Countries, 32 J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2010).
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In the last decade, China has expanded the possibilities for
citizen-based pollution regulation. China has expanded the legal
possibilities for pollution compensation redress27 through
reversing the burden of proof of causation,28 allowing collective
action with multiple plaintiffs,29 introducing disclosure systems,30
expanding public participation in environmental impact
assessments,31 and introducing a system providing for the right
to environmental information.32 The state has also made efforts
27. For an elaborate discussion of this, see Benjamin van Rooij, The People's
Regulation: Citizens and Implementation of Law in China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
(forthcoming Aug. 2012).
28. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Shui Wu Ran Fang Zhi Fa (中
华人民共和国水污染防治法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. of the Sixth Nat’l People’s Cong., May. 11, 1984, amended pursuant to
the Decision on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution adopted at the 19th meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Eight National People’s Congress on May 15, 1996,
and amended at the 32nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
National People’s Congress on Feb. 28, 2008) art 87 (China); Zhong Hua Ren
Min Gong He Guo Gu Ti Fei Wu Fang Zhi Fa (中华人民共和国固体废物防治法)
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Solid
Waste] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Eight Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Oct. 30, 1995, amended pursuant to the Decision on Amending the Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution
adopted at the 13th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National
People’s Congress on Dec. 29, 2004) art. 86 (China); Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan
Guan Yu Min Shi Su Song Zheng Ju de Ruo Gan Gui Ding (最高人民法院
关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定) [Supreme People’s Court Various Regulations
Rgearding Evidence for Civil Suits] (promulgated by the Sup. Peoples’Ct. Dec. 6,
2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) art. 4 section 3 (China).
29. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Min Shi Su Song Fa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法)
[Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil Procedure] (promulgated by the
seventh Nat’l People’s Cong. at the 4th Plenary Apr. 9, 1991, amended pursuant
to the decision on Amending the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Civil
Procedure adopted at the 13th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
Nat’l People’s Congress on Oct. 28, 2007) art 53 (China); Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra note
28, at art. 88.
30. See generally Hua Wang et al., Environmental Performance Rating and
Disclosure: China's Green-Watch Program (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2889, 2002), available at http://www-wds. worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/10/18/000094946_02100304104987/a
dditional/126526322_20041117182557.pdf.
31. See generally VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11.
32. See JAMIE P. HORSLEY, CHINA L. CTR., YALE L. SCH., UPDATE ON CHINA’S
OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION REGULATIONS: SURPRISING PUBLIC DEMAND
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to engage citizens in its law enforcement work, establishing
special complaint hotlines, offering rewards for reliable citizen
information about pollution, and getting citizens involved in
pollution enforcement campaigns targeted at citizen grievances.33
Meanwhile, Chinese environmental civil society organizations
have become increasingly active in aiding and stimulating
citizens to take action against pollution.34
These measures seem to have had some effect. There is
increasing evidence that, despite limited political freedom and a
non-independent judiciary, Chinese citizens living in the vicinity
of polluting enterprises have become increasingly activist –
helped in part by China’s growing environmental NGO
movement.35 For instance, citizens have sued chemical plants
responsible for destroying their fishponds. They have voiced
formal complaints demanding enforcement action from
environmental authorities. They have petitioned other local and
national government institutions, going all the way to Beijing.
Lastly, citizens have organized mass demonstrations against
pollution.36 Citizens play an increasingly important role in
Chinese pollution regulation, and the numbers prove it. In 2006,
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China received
616,122 complaints and petitions from citizens concerning

YIELDING SOME POSITIVE RESULTS 2 (2010), available at http://www.
law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CLOGI_Update_for_freedominfo_Horsley_article_4-6-10.pdf.
33. See VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11, ch. 14.
34. See generally van Rooij, supra note 25.
35. See Peter Ho, Greening without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and
Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 893, 899-900 (2001). See generally
CHINA'S EMBEDDED ACTIVISM: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF A SOCIAL
MOVEMENT (Peter Ho & Richard Louis Edmonds eds., 2008) (laying out an
overview of Chinese Environmental NGOs); Guobin Yang, Environmental NGOs
and Institutional Dynamics in China, 46 CHINA Q. 181 (2005).
36. See William P. Alford et al., The Human Dimensions of Pollution Policy
Implementation: Air Quality in Rural China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 32 (2002);
Jun Jing, Environmental Protests in China, in CHINESE SOCIETY: CHANGE,
CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 197, 200-02 (Elisabeth J. Perry & Mark Selden eds.,
2004). See generally ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S FUTURE (2004); VAN ROOIJ, supra note
11; Anna M. Brettell, The Politics of Public Participation and the Emergence of
Environmental Proto-Movements in China (Dec. 9, 2003) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with the University of Maryland).
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pollution37 compared to 247,741 in 2000. Meanwhile, the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) stated that
over 510,000 cases of “public conflict” had been initiated in 2005
by “severe environmental problems” that threatened social
stability.38 Citizens have even tried to sue polluters in China’s
notoriously inaccessible and protectionist courts: the number of
cases has fluctuated, with 2,146 cases nationwide in 2006,
compared to 4,453 and 1,545 in 2004 and 2005, respectively.39
Most analyses of citizen activism against pollution have
looked at court cases,40 at the effects of complaints on
enforcement,41 or at linkages between income levels, pollution
levels, and complaints.42 Generally, we know that citizens in
China, as elsewhere, require a certain amount of independence
from the local industry to take action.43 We also know that
knowledge about pollution need not lead to the development of a
cause for complaint and a resultant course of action.44 We
understand that local governments and industries can obstruct
citizens attempting to take action, while legal aid centers and the

37. STATE ENVTL. PROT. ADMIN., ZHONGGUO HUANJING TONGJI NIANBAO 2006
[CHINA ENVIRONMENT STATISTICAL REPORT 2006] (2007).
38. Officials: Environmental Deterioration Threatens Social Stability, BBC
CHINESE. COM, (Apr. 19, 2006, 4:10 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/
simp/low/newsid_4920000/newsid_4923800/4923810.stm.
39. Representative Mei Lüzhong: Recommendations on the Establishment of
Environmental Tribunals, XINHUA (Mar. 8, 2008, 4:49 PM), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/08/content_7746377.htm.
40. See generally Rachel E. Stern, On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in
Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 LAW & POL’Y 79 (2010); van Rooij,
supra note 25; Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in
China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 207 (2007).
41. See, e.g., van Rooij & Lo, supra note 9, at 22; Carlos Wing Hung Lo & Sai
Wing Leung, Environmental Agency and Public Opinion in Guangzhou: The
Limits of a Popular Approach to Environmental Governance, 163 CHINA Q. 677,
680 (2000). See generally Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Gerald Erick Fryxell,
Governmental and Societal Support for Environmental Enforcement in China:
An Empirical Study in Guangzhou, 41 J. DEV. STUD. 558 (2005).
42. van Rooij & Lo, supra note 9, at 24.
43. van Rooij, supra note 25, at 61.
44. Id. at 61-62.
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media can be very helpful, if the citizens can get them to help
out.45
C. Aims, Methods, and Outline
Existing studies offer a limited view of citizen-based pollution
regulation. An initial problem is that existing data and analyses
tell us little about how citizens are moved to take action and
assume a regulatory role. We understand little about the
interaction between the citizens, the factories involved, and local
state actors. Few of them have looked in depth at how citizens
perceive pollution problems and how such awareness translates
into courses of action.46 Moreover, existing studies have been
biased towards cases in which citizens took action outside of their
own locality. These studies fail to inform us of cases where
citizens either did not take action or took action only through
localized negotiations or protests that were not covered by the
media.
Michelson’s work on dispute processing in China
demonstrates that there are many citizens with grievances who
do not take action outside their locality, either putting up with
such problems or seeking local options.47
Against the background of the promises and challenges of
community-based regulation and the limitations of existing
research, this article presents a unique in-depth analysis of a
localized pattern of citizen involvement in pollution regulation.
This pattern, which is drawn from a detailed ethnographic case
study of one locality in southwestern China, has three aspects.
First, despite a well-developed awareness of pollution related

45. Id. at 62; see also Kathinka Fürst, Access to Justice in Environmental
Disputes: Opportunities and Obstacles for Chinese Pollution Victims (2008)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oslo) (on file with author).
46. See, e.g., Anna Lora-Wainwright, An Anthropology of ‘Cancer Villages’:
Villagers’ Perspectives and the Politics of Responsibility, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA
79 (2010); Jing, supra note 36; Bryan Tilt, Perceptions of Risk from the
Industrial Pollution in China: A Comparison of Occupational Groups, 65 HUM.
ORG. 115 (2006); Alford et al., supra note 36.
47. See Ethan Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda: Grievances and
Appeals to the Official Justice System in Rural China, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 459
(2007) [hereinafter Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda]; Ethan Michelson,
Justice From Above or Below? Popular Strategies for Resolving Grievances in
Rural China, 193 CHINA Q. 43 (2008).
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damage,48 citizens have only made limited use of the possible
avenues open to them to deal with pollution. In one instance,
citizen action was undertaken in a locally isolated manner at the
village or town level, and consisted chiefly of negotiation and
collective action. Citizens did not initiate legal action; they did
not seek advice from lawyers; they did not file a complaint with
the environmental protection authorities; they did not contact one
of the environmental legal aid centers, and they did not seek the
help of the media, even when the media came to speak to them.49
Second, citizen demands largely focused on redress rather than
ending or preventing the environmental damage. Third, citizen
action resulted in compensation, not regulation; the years of
collective action and negotiation resulted in minor pay-offs that
barely covered the costs of pollution and had no effect on the
pollution control of the factories involved. This pattern has
proved resilient, despite its limited effects to control pollution or
even to get sufficient compensation.
The study of this pattern offers us a unique first insight into
how and why citizens have organized localized forms of activism
to deal with pollution, which has so far been left largely
unexamined. This view is unique as it goes beyond studies that
are based on cases reported in the media, in court, or in
governmental records. If all instances of citizen-based pollution
regulation are an iceberg, the cases studied so far are just the tip
that is visible above the water.
The pattern of localized
regulation studied in this paper is the part that has remained
obscured under the water. Since we lack data, there is no way of
knowing how such an iceberg is shaped, whether it is a pyramid,
a cone, or some form of a rectangle. We can guess that the
pattern studied here is not exceptional. As we know from
Michelson’s quantitative study of dispute processing in China,
many citizens take no action (thirty-three percent) or just
bilateral action negotiating with the person they deem

48. See Anna Lora-Wainwright, Collective Illness Experiences and Individual
Uncertainty: Rural Industrial Pollution and Lay Epidemiology in China
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
49. On this process, see Anna Lora-Wainwright et al., Learning to Live with
Pollution: The Making of Environmental Subjects in a Chinese Industrialised
Village, 68 CHINA J. (forthcoming July 2012).
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responsible for their grievances (forty-seven percent)50, and if
they do, many take localized forms of action.51
This article seeks to understand this particular pattern of
citizen-based pollution regulation. It explores why it developed
and what sustains it. This article derives lessons about the
possibilities and conditions for pollution regulation in similar
contexts. It argues that the social, economic, and political
contexts in the local community are deeply affected by the
processes of industrialization that in turn give rise to a particular
form of community-based pollution regulation. In this form,
monetary redress for damages caused by industrial activities –
whether pollution or loss of land – becomes an overarching end.
It reframes the way damages are viewed and grievances are
developed, limiting the courses of action that could be taken and
restraining the outcomes of such action. We find that in this
case, industrialization developed into a “compensation trap,”
where activism became passivism, where solidarity was replaced
by opportunism, and where awareness about the dangers of
pollution could not translate into effective demands to control or
decrease discharges. The paper analyzes how the compensation
trap developed and through inference draws larger lessons for
pollution regulation in China and countries with similar
contexts.52
Apart from the large body of academic knowledge on
pollution regulation and citizen activism, the article draws on
insights from Gaventa’s work, which studies the historical
formation of power and powerlessness in an industrial
community53. Gaventa teaches the importance of industrial
stratification and the vital role that framing structures54 can

50. See Michelson, Climbing the Dispute Pagoda, supra note 47, at 466.
51. Id.
52. Awareness levels can vary significantly, and it is worth considering
whether more detailed knowledge about the risks entailed by pollution would
translate into action.
53. JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS, QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION
IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (Clarendon Press. 1980).
54. Framing structures indicate the discursive frames through which people
see, understand, and discuss social reality. See generally Maarten Hajer,
Discourse Analysis and the Study of Policy Making, EUROPEAN POL. SCI.,
Autumn 2002, at 61.
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have on particular instances of agency. The article also draws
from power theorists about the organizational,55 behavioral,56
and exclusionary57 aspects of how power shapes activism, as well
as the framing aspects of power when a structure of thought58 or
routine59 influences grievance development and courses of action.
This study is based on data collected in 2009 through
extensive fieldwork carried out in five sub-villages in
southwestern China, with an in-depth study of two of them. The
team of researchers included social scientists, lawyers, and
medical experts. The fieldwork methodology was anthropological
in nature, consisting of semi-structured interviews, both long and
short, and ranging from semi-formal to highly informal, as well as
observations made during the weeks living in the local village.
Additional data was gathered earlier in 2004 when an initial
study was done on state regulation, which included interviews
with relevant state enforcement agents, village leaders, and a
limited number of villagers.60 For the sake of confidentiality, all
names of persons and places have been changed.
The remainder of this article consists of three sections
detailing what we have identified as the three stages of
community-based regulation: (1) industrial compensation in the
planned economy; (2) compensation contracts and collective
action; and (3) resource capitalism and opportunist acquiescence.
These three stages should not be seen as strict chronological

55. See BARRY BARNES, THE NATURE OF POWER (1988).
56. See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202-04
(1957); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN
CITY (1961); ROBERT A. DAHL, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 408 (David S. Sills ed., 1968).
57. See Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 947, 949 (1962); ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN
PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960).
58. See generally STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 34-35 (1st ed. 1974);
MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON (1965); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY:
OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984).
59. See generally GIDDENS, supra note 58; Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and
Symbolic Power, 7 SOC. THEORY 14 (1989).
60. See generally VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11 (detaling findings from this
study).
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periods61 but rather as analytical constructs that allow us to
group and highlight important aspects. These aspects constitute
the evolution of community-based regulation and ultimately
result in the formation of the compensation trap. These sections
are followed by a discussion of how discursive and practice
frameworks form during these three stages and how these
frameworks influence community-based regulation. Finally, we
conclude by drawing out the theoretical and practical
implications of the Baocun findings.
II.

INDUSTRIAL COMPENSATION IN THE
PLANNED ECONOMY

A. When Industrialization Started
A few decades ago, Baocun was a purely agricultural village
located in the hills adjacent to a river in southwestern China.
Farmers cultivated wet rice on the best land, using water
buffaloes to plow the paddies, while other land was used to grow
corn and vegetables. Life was not easy; in some years villagers
struggled to meet the state grain quota. Industrialization arrived
when the village’s immense phosphorus resources attracted state
and collective investment. A large state-owned factory, called
Linchang, started production, and several collectively-owned
mines began to produce the raw materials needed in the factory.
Meanwhile, village collectives initiated enterprises to make
products for Linchang.
This was the time of the planned economy, when income
originated from either the state or the collective.
Industrialization brought state investments to the village and
thereby increased the collective income, which no longer solely
depended on agriculture. The new state-owned factory required
village land for its premises. To compensate the village for the
lost land, it offered to take on a set number of villagers as formal

61. A very general chronological indication sets the first stage from the early
1980s until the late 1980s, the second stage from the mid-1980s until
(depending which sub-village) 2004-present, followed by the last stage, which
has only occurred in some of the sub-villages (most notably in Tazu) starting
from about 2004.
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employees with full benefits, including housing, insurance, and
pensions.62 Meanwhile, the collective factories and mines also
needed land. Seeing as the collective enterprises did not need to
compensate themselves for using collectively owned land, they
acquired it in exchange for nothing.
Industrialization brought pollution to Baocun. Pollution
sickened the local livestock,63 and farmers were no longer able to
use water buffaloes (shuiniu) to plow their rice paddies. In
addition, the lively agricultural market that used to be organized
in the center of Baocun ceased to be profitable.64 To compensate
for the sickened livestock, Linchang not only offered to buy the
buffaloes65 but also offered to incorporate market personnel into
the factory as formal workers.66
This was a time when villagers still wanted to become formal
workers. It offered a unique opportunity for upwards social
mobility, providing income, housing, insurance, and pension
benefits as well as the status of a worker. Worker registration
proved that one was no longer tied to the village but to the
factory.67 Industrialization thus led to stratification and the
creation of a new social stratum, the industrial worker, adding to
the original strata of peasants and leaders. The ties between the
state enterprise and the village were still loose and largely
consisted of linkages between the state and the collective
industries, without directly affecting the incomes of local

62. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with
Elder Male Retired Worker, in Baocun, China (May 12, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with
Elder Female Villager, in Baocun, China (May 5, 2009) (interview transcript on
file with author).
63. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with
Elder Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 5, 2009) (interview transcript on
file with author).
64. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elder Male Villager, in
Baocun, China (Apr. 30, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
65. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Male Villager,
in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
66. Interview with Elder Male Villager, supra note 63.
67. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Female
Village Committee Member, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author).
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villagers. All of this set the first stage of community-based
regulation in Baocun village.
B. The First Community-Based Regulation
At the first stage, industrialization caused damage that was
compensated for in a very indirect manner: no calculation of the
damage was made nor was the damage attributed to specific
individuals. Instead, a social package was offered by the state as
a douceur for the adverse effects of industrialization. The state
thus acted as a generous benefactor, and villagers were expected
to be happy with what they got. In this first stage, no clear
relation
existed
between
compensation
and
damage.
Compensation in the planned economy came from the state and
was initiated by the state. It did not involve much participation
or negotiation from the village collective, let alone individual
villagers. As a result, no activism was needed for this type of
compensation. In any case, there was no context in which
activism could be organized without direct repercussions. It was
still a time where the town police came into the village to arrest
villagers reported to have voiced critical opinions against the
state.68 The compensation package of the planned economy had
no regulatory intentions or effects, as there was little to induce
the factory to prevent or control any damage. The compensation
paid to the villagers consisted of salaries that the factory would
have had to pay its workers anyway. The first stage set a path
that guided later instances of community regulation. It has left a
legacy of the all-powerful state that supports the industry and of
the powerlessness of local citizens who should be happy to get
anything for the damage incurred.

68. Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62.
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COMPENSATION CONTRACTS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION

A. The Start of Compensation for Land Loss and
Pollution
The second stage of community-based regulation began when
the factory started to pay the village collective to compensate for
pollution and loss of collective land. It was at this stage that
damage caused by the industry became linked to monetary
compensation as well as the provision of certain services like
irrigation and road construction. It was also at this stage that
villagers tried to organize collective action to get or improve such
compensation.
Monetary compensation commenced when Linchang needed
land to store residue from the phosphorous chemical fertilizer
production (i.e., phosphor gypsum, linshigao). It did not acquire
land in return for labor contracts; instead, it offered the Qingyizu
sub-village a fixed amount of money for storing its waste on a
designated area in their hills. A ten-year contract between the
factory and the sub-village was signed, under which the factory
paid 15,000 RMB69 annually to the sub-village collective.70 In the
neighboring sub-village of Qingerzu, where the factory also
wanted to store part of its waste residue, a similar contract was
signed. It was stipulated that as long as the factory exists, it will
provide free irrigation water in exchange for waste storage.71
Other pollution compensation contracts followed, as industrial
pollution became increasingly manifest: crops failed, the water
deteriorated, and the air started to smell. With the largest
compensation contract, Linchang paid Tazu sub-village 66,000
RMB annually for what was termed “agricultural compensation,”
which actually consisted of payments for damage resulting from
pollution. Linchang also paid contract-based compensation to the
69. RMB stands for Ren Min Bi, China’s national currency.
70. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Male Qing
Yizu Sub-Village Committee Representative, in Baocun, China (Apr. 27, 2009)
(interview transcript on file with author).
71. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Qing Erzu Sub-village
Leader, in Baocun, China (Apr. 28, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
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Jiaoqingzu sub-village of around 10,000 RMB and a couple of
thousand to the Qingyizu sub-village.72 Smaller factories and
mines also entered into compensation agreements, often framed
as end-of-year bonuses (guonianqian), paying 200 RMB to each
villager involved and often paying more for elderly people.73
Concurrently with an uptick in pollution compensation, this
stage saw an increasing amount of money flowing into the
collective village finance as a result of payments by industry for
the land used for industrial premises and mines. This change
occurred as privatization set in, and the original collective and
state-owned industry became mostly privately-owned.74 As a
result, land was no longer provided without payment to the
collective factories and mines; it was to be paid for, on the basis of
long-term contracts. The village collective remitted some of the
money to the villagers, who started to get an extra 200 to 300
RMB as end-of-year bonuses.75
B. Negotiation and Activism for Compensation
Citizens no longer remained passive bystanders in all of this
and started to actively seek better compensation. With different
degrees of success, citizens organized themselves to support
negotiations for pollution compensation deals or to voice that they
were not happy with the deals made. They organized different
forms of action, including independent testing of water wells,76
joint requests to village leaders, and blockades of factory
premises, mines, or major transport routes to industrial

72. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Vice-Secretary of the
Village Committee, in Baocun, China (Apr. 27, 2009) (interview transcript on
file with author).
73. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Sub-Village Leader Qing
Yizu, in Baocun, China (Apr. 27, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
74. See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH
121 (2007).
75. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Wife of Baita Sub-village
Leader, in Baocun, China (Apr. 30, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
76. Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62.
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complexes. Villagers in Tazu sub-village were particularly active;
they have a local reputation for ferocity and solidarity.77
At first an attempt was made to involve the town authorities.
Village leaders organized villagers to write a joint petition to the
town government complaining about Linchang’s pollution. The
attempted petition failed, however, and the town authorities
declined to consider their grievances. Villagers recall that
Linchang sent two cars with what they think were gifts to the
village leaders, who later no longer pursued the petition.78
In another incident, in Tazu, Linchang’s discharge pipes were
somehow connected to the village irrigation canals, and the acidic
wastewater killed crops. Meanwhile, villagers noted that there
was a high incidence of gallstones. The villagers went to the
factory and demanded that it provide the same clean water as the
factory itself used, and arrange free health check-ups. The
factory agreed to give them the water but refused to give them
check-ups.79
Following another spillage that killed crops and resulted in
more complaints that they did not feel well (bushufu), villagers
went to the factory to protest (qu nao).80 After the factory had
investigated the matter, it agreed to pay a fee based on the
amount of land that was involved.81 From this moment onwards,
the sub-village started to receive an annual fixed compensation
fee of 66,000 RMB.82 Here again, villagers had demanded health
check-ups, a demand which the factory ignored. As one villager
recalls, “[The factory] did not dare, and even if check-ups had
turned up diseases, they would not have told [the villagers].”83

77. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with
Niece of Village Leader, in Baocun, China (May 4, 2009) (interview transcript on
file with author).
78. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with
Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, in Baocun, China (May 11, 2009)
(interview transcript on file with author).
79. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader, in
Baocun, China (May 14, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
80. Interview with Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78.
81. Interview with Elder Retired Worker, supra note 62.
82. Interview with Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78;
Interview with Elder Retired Worker, supra note 62.
83. Interview with Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78.
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An explosion in the sulphuric acid (liusuan) plant several
years later, which again had major effects on local crops and fish,
sparked another round of activism. The village leaders and the
factory had originally reached a deal after the factory itself sent
its environmental protection division to investigate. The deal
meant that the factory would pay for the damage, the annual
compensation payment would be raised to 100,000 RMB, and the
payment be raised again every three years.84 Villagers were not
happy with the deal as they considered the compensation too low.
In addition, they discovered that village leaders received more
than others. In response, half of Tazu sub-village went to the
factory in protest, some bringing dead fish from their polluted
fish ponds.85 This time, factory representatives responded that
they would not talk with villagers, only with their formal
representatives. To no avail, villagers responded: “Who says so?
The masses (qunzhong) are representatives, the masses are
community members, the masses are also leaders (guan).”86 In
the end their pleas fell on deaf ears as the factory continued to
refuse to negotiate with them. Finally, the village leaders
convinced them to leave and let them talk with the factory.87 At
the time, the local media was barred from reporting the accident
on orders of the local government.88
C. The Role of Local Leaders
Village leaders have played an important, albeit contested
role, in the formation and execution of these contracts as well as
in the organization of collective action. They were active in the
negotiations for the compensation. They were stimulated to do so
by the industry, which excluded all but the village leaders from
the negotiations. Village leaders were thereby placed in an
intermediary position between the villagers and the factories.
This position presented an opportunity for private gain, as the

84. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 62.
85. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65.
86. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elderly Female Villager, in
Baocun, China (May 15, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
87. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 79.
88. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65.
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factory has provided preferential benefits to village leaders,
especially following bouts of local collective action.89 Not only
were they offered better compensation for their land, they were
also rumored to have taken part of the collective compensation
package offered to the village. In Qingyizu, for instance, a deal
was reached in which the factory would pay the sub-village
150,000 RMB over a period of ten years; after five years, villagers
found out that the money paid over that period, 75,000 RMB, was
missing.90 Leaders were also suspected of keeping most of the
income made through land deals and only relaying part of the
money to villagers via the end-of-year bonus system. Village
leaders could also benefit from their monopoly control by
providing non-local labor to the local factories. They could do so
when Linchang started to hire temporary laborers, who were not
offered a full contract with all benefits and worker status. At
first, these workers were largely drawn from the local
countryside, but gradually, the factory preferred to hire non-local
laborers, especially for the heavy work which locals increasingly
did not like to do. Linchang let the Baocun village leaders
establish a labor agency that has had the exclusive authority to
arrange for such temporary labor contracts and has allowed the
leaders to make a hefty profit. 91
All of this affected the role that leaders played at this stage of
collective action. On the one hand, interviewees pointed out that
this generation of leaders was more willing to support collective
action, as their corruption meant they could benefit directly, with
less of the money going to the villagers.92 On the other hand,
interviewees stressed that the older leaders suppressed collective
89. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 79.
90. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Male Villager,
in Baocun, China (July 7, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
91. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62; Interview by
Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with Middle-aged Male
Migrant Worker, in Baocun, China (May 10, 2009) (interview transcript on file
with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright
with Middle-aged Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 11, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with
Middle-aged Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author).
92. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader, in
Baocun, China (May 15, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
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action, scolding those who wanted to protest and telling villagers
that only the leaders should talk with the factory.93 This dual
perception is best understood by their dual role. They could
benefit from deals made with the factories and thus would
condone some amount of pressure to arrange these deals. At the
same time, they would not benefit if protests got out of hand and
upset higher levels of government or the industry they were so
indebted to.
Here we see that the factories were not neutral. By co-opting
local leaders and strengthening their bargaining position in
pollution, land, and labor agreements, they tied villagers to
leaders who were more likely to serve their own financial
interests rather than local public interests. The factories have
carefully responded to pollution-related demands, paying
relatively small amounts for material damage while consistently
refusing to give in to potentially more difficult demands related to
health, such as medical check-ups.
D. The Role of Governmental Regulators
In all of this, the role of the State as pollution regulator
remained limited. Although the Chinese state started to regulate
pollution in earnest by the mid-1990s,94 it seems to have had
little effect on industrial pollution. After the state EPBs started
regular on-site inspections, they failed for years to uncover that
local factories were secretly and illegally discharging and
emitting pollution at night by switching off their environmental
installations. In one case, the provincial EPB even sent a team of
inspectors to live on-site for a period, after which an
environmental responsibility contract was signed between the
factory and the EPB detailing an internal responsibility system
involving top-to-bottom management for pollution control

93. Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62; Interview with
Niece of Village Leader, supra note 79.
94. See generally MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 12; BARBARA J. SINKULE &
LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA (1995);
Benjamin van Rooij, Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through
Enforcement, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (J. Chen et al. eds., 2002); VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11.
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results.95 For a long time Linchang was listed as a compliant
factory.96 Inspection agents seem to have been unable to detect
the local problems, as inspections were too few and too limited to
detect that anything unusual was happening. Since the state
failed to successfully engage local villagers, villagers kept a
distance from the state such that the environmental authorities
had difficulty ascertaining the pollution issues that were so wellknown by the locals.97
The second stage of community-based regulation was thus
one of compensation contracts and collective action.
Compensation contracts regularized land and pollution claims.
While they generally linked damage to compensation, they did so
for a longer term and at the village level, making it difficult for
individual villagers to know how the compensation they were
finally paid was related to the damage incurred. Citizens started
to play a role, albeit one that was set and staged within a tight
framework. Their role was to highlight and support claims,
which were then negotiated in a closed setting involving village
and enterprise “leaders” (dangguande). Only leaders decided how
much money was to be paid and its distribution. Citizen-based
activism was confined within set boundaries. The boundaries
were perceived through experience, as villagers learned what
action would lead to compensation, what action was seriously
checked, and what would be ignored.98 Failure to involve outside
support in the proposed petition was followed by a period in
which no further attempts were made. Activism, as villagers
knew and their leaders stressed, should not attract too much
attention from the higher levels and cause trouble. Villagers
largely took what was offered, even though what they got was not
based on the actual damage that had occurred (i.e., loss of land or
pollution). Despite increasing solidarity, the second stage still
had a sense of orientation around sub-villages.
This was
definitely the case in Tacun, the activist sub-village, where
villagers strove to increase their joint income even though they
knew their leaders were pocketing a substantial amount of it.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Interview with Middle-aged Male Migrant Worker, supra note 91.
See VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11, at 198.
See id. at chs. 13-14.
See Lora-Wainwright et al., supra note 49.
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E. Compensation Legitimizing and Normalizing
Pollution
In the second stage, compensation seems to have had a
legitimizing instead of a regulatory effect, as payment bought a
license to pollute. In community claims, villagers did not make
value judgments about pollution, refraining from normative
claims about the unjust, illegal or immoral nature of pollution.
Claims were about redress; they were about payment for damage
or finding out about damage. They were not about ending,
controlling, or decreasing pollution. Claims paid seemed not to
have had much, if any, deterrent effect, simply because the
amounts remained very low in comparison with the costs of
abatement. Here, the riches of the factories stand in stark
contrast to the poverty of the villagers, for whom a small amount
of compensation was a welcome addition to their income.
Furthermore, villagers were not free to accept or decline
compensation offers like the co-opted village leaders, whose
interests were aligned with the industry dominated negotiations.
Thus, redress started to preclude regulation.
The legacy of the second stage has been two-fold. First,
contractual compensation has rationalized pollution and made it
routine, setting the compensation tightly in a frame of redress
and not pollution regulation. Second, collective action is clearly
set within this frame as well as within the larger frame of
growing stratification and increasing interdependencies (among
the village, its leadership, the industrial complex and the state),
keeping activism focused on material redress and away from
state involvement or other outside forms of support.
IV.

RESOURCE CAPITALISM AND OPPORTUNIST
ACQUIESCENCE

A. Deepening Interdependencies
At the third stage of community-based regulation,
compensation derived from the industrial complex (whether for
land usage or pollution) becomes an important source of
individual income. This deepens the interdependencies between
villagers, their leaders, and the industrial complex, creating a
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setting in which local activism is strongly directed towards
redress instead of regulation. It also deepens stratification by
dividing pollution victims and undermining the solidarity
necessary for consorted action. The activism that continues
during this period has opportunist characteristics and is limited
through leadership control and community acquiescence.
While villagers depended largely on work for income until the
third stage, whether through agricultural or industrial labor,
land use compensation began to make up a large part of the local
income. This started when new leaders were elected in 2004.
These new leaders broke with the old tradition of splitting only a
small portion of collective income amongst villagers, instead
initiating a fenhong (division of the red) system. Through this
system, Tazu villagers received a per-capita annual income of
8000 RMB in 2009 and 15,000 RMB in 2008,99 when a large
amount of land usage compensation was paid by a local mine.100
This resource-based, work-free income paid more than most
villagers made working in fields or factories. The new leaders
also broke with the old policy severely restricting housing
development. Farmers have thereby started to earn extra income
renting out rooms in newly built houses to the many migrants
that have by now come to work in Baocun101 (about sixty to
eighty per room per month, with one household for instance
renting fourteen rooms102). Such land-related income has now
become so important that there is much concern when outsiders
marry into the village, especially with respect to divorce, as many
believe they should also abandon their local Tazu registration
(hukou) and related fenhong entitlements.103 People even pay
considerable sums of money to retain or get a Tazu registration,
willingly paying up to 10,000 RMB, seeing it as a good
99. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Female
Villager, in Baocun, China (May 19, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author); Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 77; Interview with
Middle-aged Female Rice Noodle Seller, supra note 78.
100. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62.
101. Interview with Middle-aged Male Qing Yizu Sub-village Committee
Representative, supra note 70.
102. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Female Local Doctor, in
Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
103. Interview with Wife of Baita Sub-village Leader, supra note 75.
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investment. Life in Tazu village has changed; many people now
depend on this resource-based income and have more time for
leisure. As a result, the sub-village now boasts an extraordinary
amount of majiang halls,104 where the locals spend their days
playing and gambling.105 Sub-village leaders have used the
money to organize popular holidays for villagers to
Xishuanbanna, Shanghai, and Beijing.106
The third stage, as it is presently unfolding, shows a
deepening of the stratification initiated by the process of
industrialization.
It seems that the original industrial
stratification has reversed: while in the collective days formal
worker status was the most desired position, now, at least in
Tazu, villager status has become more desirable because of landrelated income. As one villager stated, “In the past, workers’
lives were better than farmers’, now farmers do better than
workers.”107
Additionally, there are now clear differences
between the resource-capitalist villagers of Tazu, who get a
significant portion of their income from the rent derived from
land compensation and housing, and the villagers from other subvillages who only receive a small amount of such income, too little
to stop or even reduce working. Furthermore, migrants have
become a dominant stratum in Baocun; there are now more
migrants living there than native villagers. The migrants have a
special status, with only limited citizenship in the village. They
can rent housing, work in local factories and fields, and arrange
schooling for their children; however, they do not get to

104. More than ten public ones and many private ones at home. Interview by
Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Female Local Market Salesperson, in Baocun,
China (May 20, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
105. Interview with Middle-aged Male Migrant Worker, supra note 91;
Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-aged Male Owner of
Majiang Hall, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author); Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-aged Male Local
Mine Worker, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
106. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Female Accountant of
Sub-village, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
107. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middle-aged Female
Villager, in Baocun, China (Apr. 26, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
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participate in the local elections, nor can they share in the
collective resources that have become a more important part of
village income. Their limited village citizenship also excludes
them from income-derived pollution compensation contracts,
which are based on land to which they have no formal
entitlement.
As Tazu villagers now receive an important source of income
from revenue derived from the industrial complex, they are tied
to the local industries more strongly than ever. While in the past
their income was largely agricultural, and thus independent of
industry, few presently engage in agriculture. Pollution has
made agriculture difficult, and land-related income has made it
unattractive, hard work with little pay. Villagers let migrants
cultivate the land, as they do not want it to lie idle and get
covered in long grass (changcao). One villager explained that
would mean that they would lose entitlement to pollution-related
compensation. Local villagers also derive income from the
industrial complex as factory workers and as transporters with
small private transport companies. The industrial complex has
enabled the development of a service sector, with many food and
leisure haunts catering to the land-lucky villagers of Tazu. The
migrants attracted by the industrial complex provide further
income to villagers. As one migrant explained, “Of every five
chickens sold in the local market, four are bought by migrants.”
The intermediary position of local leaders, between villagers and
the industrial complex, has only strengthened in the third phase,
given that the village leaders have arranged the land-related
revenue. They have therefore gained local legitimacy and voter
support for future elections, while also maintaining favorable ties
with the local industry through the continued and increasingly
lucrative control of the labor company. Villagers in Tazu thus
depend more on their leaders than ever before, seeing as they are
now responsible for a large share of their income.
B. Continued Pollution and Increasing Awareness
As described above, the third stage reflects an intricate web
of interdependencies between local villagers, migrants, industrial
enterprises and mines, and village leaders. Meanwhile, pollution
continues, both regular and incidental. Although there have been
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some improvements, given the pollution abatement investments
made by Linchang, villagers still report many pollution-related
problems. They informed us that they are still unable to grow
certain crops or keep certain livestock. They are very careful
about using water from local wells, fearing that it is polluted or
even poisonous. They ascribe certain health-related problems to
pollution, which some call strange diseases (guaibing). These
include nose infections and nose bleeds, rheumatism and sore
joints, headaches, memory loss, bad teeth and weak bones (which
they fear comes from fluorosis), issues related to reproductive
organs, and even a higher incidence of certain kinds of cancer
according to some villagers. Some said that for years now, their
youngsters have been unable to pass army medical tests.
Villagers also complained of a bad smell at night, which the
research team likewise noted. Some call this smell “poison gas”
and explain that it is emitted at night by Linchang. They also
related that the enterprises use the cover of night to discharge
polluted water from the phosphorus mineral cleaning process.
There have also been several accidents at Linchang and the other
factories. The worst occurred in 2008 when a sulfuric acid depot
exploded at Linchang, killing five and leaving twenty-two
wounded. While citizens are clearly aware of the problems
pollution causes, our interviews also showed a habituation.
Villagers told us that you get used to the smell and that you can
adapt to pollution by planting different crops, closing your
window, or drinking bottled mineral water.108 As one villager
explained: “Pollution? We all get pollution. And if the pollution is
really bad, and you cannot grow anything on your land, then don’t
grow anything, let it lie idle and buy some food.”109

108. Interview with Female Local Market Salesperson, supra note 104,
Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with Elder
Female Villager, in Baocun, China (May 4, 2009) (interview transcript on file
with author), Interview with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62;
Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with Middle
Aged Male Villager, in Baocun, China (May 3, 2009) (interview transcript on file
with author).
109. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Anna Lora Wainwright with
Middle-aged Male Worker, in Baocun, China (May 13, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author).
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At this stage, compensation contracts continue and are
largely based on agreements made in the second stage. The
largest contract between Linchang and Tazu is renegotiated
based on the earlier terms that compensation will be raised once
every three years. At the beginning of the next term, it is
expected that the factory will pay Tazu an annual compensation
of 150,000 RMB, a 20,000 RMB increase from the 130,000 RMB
paid in 2009. The contracts seem at this stage to have become a
set affair, as they are based on agreements made in the past and
form a regular additional source of income for villagers. One
difference with the past is that leaders now seem to perform
better in distributing the income from these contracts to the
relevant villagers involved, rather than keeping part of the
compensation for themselves as in the past.
C. Reduced Activism and Solidarity
Collective action continues, largely organized in reaction to
incidents and not against regular pollution and nightly
discharges. There have been several blockades organized by
groups of villagers. For instance, there was a chlorine leak at
Linchang that caused a terrible and bad-smelling smoke.
Villagers recall that they had trouble breathing because of the
smoke and feared for their health.110 In response, villagers
organized a blockade when their village leaders remained
unresponsive to their grievances. The blockade attracted the
attention of the local government (at the town level), which came
to deal with the matter. As a result, the factory deputy director
came to Tazu to talk with the villagers. Tazu people expressed
that they wanted the same drinking water that the factory used
and also demanded health check-ups. As in the past, the factory
agreed to give them water but refused the health check-ups,
offering 100 RMB per person instead.111 As one villager analyzed
it, “Perhaps they were afraid that the tests would reveal illnesses,
causing them trouble. That is why they had this attitude of

110. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65.
111. Id.
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tricking us (qipian de taidu), they were just fooling the people
(suisuibianbian de jiu hunongle laobaixing).”112
Another example of activism followed a major explosion of a
sulfuric acid depot at Linchang, killing five workers and
wounding twenty-two, and breaking many windows in the Tazu
sub-village. The morning after, villagers flocked to the factory
demanding compensation for relocation. Villagers told us how
this incident awakened their anxieties about the safety hazard
that the factory presents: “We all know here that there is a large
ammonia pipeline there, and if that explodes, well that is scary.”
I have heard others say: “If the ammonia pipe explodes, you can
only survive if you slit your throat to prevent the air from going
into your body.”113 In response to their worries about their safety
and the demands they made to be relocated, the factory allegedly
stated: “You can get a medical check-up, if it shows that there are
problems and you have evidence of the problems, let us talk
again.”114 Thus, the factory reframed the villagers’ original
demands and worries into a framework of compensation, where
redress based on evidence counts rather than prevention of
pollution or hazards.
Meanwhile, local leaders urged the
villagers to drop their demands and action, claiming that this is a
difficult time for the factory and that it will all be solved in due
course. Leaders allegedly stated, “If you take action in this way it
will put oil on the fire, it is not good.”115 Recalling this incident,
one villager stated, “I asked why is it not good? I fear that there
are connections (guanxi) between the leaders (dangguande) of the
factory and the village. Of course I thought so.”116 Again the
village leaders told the villagers that they would arrange the
compensation. The strong language in which all of this was said
seems to have had the effect that the villagers abandoned their
action. As far as we know, they did not even talk to the many
112. Id.
113. Interview by Jianyuan Wang, Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Middleaged Female Villager, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview transcript on
file with author).
114. Id.
115. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle-aged Female
Village Committee Member, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author).
116. Id.
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journalists or state officials who had come down to the village
following the accident. Villagers did not take action again in
relation to the explosion, although some ultimately received an
incidental compensation of 200 RMB.117
Although these incidents show that collective action
continues in the third stage, villagers have indicated that there is
less activism nowadays than in the past.118 There is less
solidarity, one local activist explained, as people have become
richer. The dependency on land-related revenues has likely had a
dampening effect on activism. With free money coming in from
land deals and citizens less engaged in agriculture, pollution has
a less direct effect on their income, while the benefits of activism
(getting pollution compensation fees of several hundred RMB) are
relatively less attractive to citizens. Land and pollution-related
compensation is divided and paid on an individual basis, while
money derived from activism has in certain instances gone to the
activists involved rather than to the whole community.
Meanwhile, villagers also see their village leaders putting their
personal interests above the community.
All of this has
influenced a culture of opportunism where solidarity is a thing of
the past. As one villager elaborated, “People do not care for
problems that are not their own. This is our biggest problem.”119
Activism has thus become wrought with opportunism. Mrs. Wu,
a leading activist involved in many of the Tazu actions, freely
admitted that she is “in it” for the money and public office, hoping
that her role in the action will get her elected into village
leadership.
The lack of solidarity exists at a deeper level than seen by
most villagers. Because of stratification and its results on village
citizenship and related entitlements, the interests of the people
suffering from pollution are not aligned. First of all, the interests
of different sub-villages are divided. As land and pollutionrelated compensation deals are established at the sub-village
level, some sub-villages, such as Tazu, have been able to get much
117. Id.
118. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader
and Male Owner of Majiang Hall, in Baocun, China (May 16, 2009) (interview
transcript on file with author).
119. Id.
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more than others. The differential treatment of pollution victims
in different sub-villages has prevented victims from joining hands
in a consorted effort. Another especially significant gap exists
between the interests of migrant workers and formal villagers.
Villagers are able to benefit from land and pollution-related
compensation packages and are therefore interested in activism
at certain times to support compensation deals. In contrast,
migrants do not share in the riches created by land and pollution
deals, although the damage they suffer from pollution is similar,
if not worse, because of their living and working conditions. In
addition, migrants, like all workers at the factory, fear
repercussions should they join collective action. As one worker
put it, “Families with members working at the factory could not
protest (qunao). Otherwise, this could affect the family salaries.
That is why I dared not go.”120
D. The Role of Town and Village Leaders
Village leaders play a vital role in the third stage. They are
responsible for the new land-related revenues, which have
transformed the social and economic life in parts of Baocun
village. Because of this, they enjoy an unprecedented amount of
local legitimacy. Many people support their political agenda of
change and transparency even though they question their
corruption and strong-willed character. The new leaders have
sprung from the industrial stratification that has occurred, with
most of them having come to power after earning riches in the
Baocun industrial complex. The new leaders are thus born from
the industrial entrepreneurs and have much closer ties with
industry than the former generation.
The village leaders,
because of the importance of the land-related revenue, have an
even stronger intermediary role between the industrial complex
and the villagers, than the former generation. All of this has
shaped their influence on collective action. In many of the cases
of collective action, the village leaders had a restricting role, both
at the Village Committee (VC) and the sub-village level. They
urged villagers to let them negotiate with the factories. Since the
factories largely excluded villagers from the negotiations, they
120. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65.
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were empowered to do so by the polluting factories involved. In
several instances, the village leaders dispersed protests, using
strong language and threats, with people obeying their
charismatic commands out of fear.121 Sometimes they did so on
instructions of the town government, which wanted an end to the
local unrest in its jurisdiction.122 And, at least in the perception
of some villagers, village leaders as well as township government
leaders wanted to protect the important industrial tax base.123
Villagers retain a mixed view of the role of village leaders in
pollution issues. On the one hand, some claim that without
village leadership support, protesting is useless.124 On the other
hand, they protest in response to the lack of support from local
leaders and find that unless they protest, they will not get the
attention of their leaders or the factories involved.125
E. Lack of Trust in State Regulators
In the third stage, state regulation has become stricter. In
2004, the municipal EPB finally took action against the ongoing
pollution in the village when it found evidence of secret nightly
discharges during an intensive inspection period organized in a
In
national environmental law enforcement campaign.126
response, it fined the Linchang company and threatened to make
the fine public. It used this threat to make a deal with Linchang
to stop outsourcing its most polluting chemical production to
small, heavily polluting enterprises located twenty kilometers
further downstream and which had been made the prime target
of this particular enforcement campaign. While this may have
had some effect on these small factories, effects in Baocun
remained limited because the company continued secret nightly
discharges while slowly investing in abatement equipment,
121. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 99.
122. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65.
123. Id.; Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elder Female Villager,
in Baocun, China (May 17, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
124. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 99; Interview by
Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Niece of Village Leader, in Baocun, China
(May 20, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
125. Interview with Middle-aged Male Villager, supra note 65.
126. See VAN ROOIJ, supra note 11, at 154.
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thereby flaunting state regulatory oversight. A few years later,
Baocun attracted the attention of the national environmental
regulator (then called SEPA), which placed one of its new
expansion projects on a list of the twenty riskiest projects in
China. Meanwhile, the local environmental authorities at the
municipal level continued to regulate the company, organizing
regular daytime inspections and reviewing environmental impact
assessment (EIA) reports for new production lines at the factory.
These reports continued to be approved, and there was a
seemingly standard section in all of them detailing the local
public view of the factory and the project. These sections were all
positive, with the citizens allegedly expressing that the factory
was doing well and the intended new production was good. It is
not clear how these sections were prepared or whether citizens
were actually interviewed, and if so, which citizens, leaders or
ordinary villagers. What is clear is that these reports do not
represent the many voices we have heard detailing pollutionrelated economic and health damage as well as local concerns
about safety. The state regulator seems to have been unable to
get in touch with local opinion. This can partly be explained by
some of the local views of the environmental authorities. Few
citizens mentioned the EPBs. The ones that did stressed their
strictness, explaining that if they would come to the village and
deal with the factories, their action would be strict.127 The
development and compensation frameworks seem to have
influenced their views on such stern action. Since there is no
belief in pollution reduction and there is a continued hope of
compensation derived income, action that punishes pollution and
perhaps reduces it is likely not welcome. Reduced pollution is
framed together with reduced development.128 On the other
hand, we heard an opportunist view that regulation would divert
compensation fees paid to the village towards fines paid to the
state.129 As Tazu leader Li said, “If the EPB comes to fine
Linchang and takes their money, is it not better that this stays
127. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62; Interview
with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62.
128. Interview with Female Local Market Salesperson, supra note 104.
129. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Baita Sub-village Leader,
in Baocun, China (May 21, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author).
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here and villagers can get it?”130 Meanwhile, prior experience
with a local protectionist state, combined with the pessimist
frame, may make villagers doubtful of what environmental
authorities can do on the local level. One villager thought that if
local leaders were less aligned with the factories, it would be
possible for the environmental authorities to come and deal with
the pollution.131 Thus, it is not surprising to hear that when
state authorities came to the village following the explosion,
villagers refrained from using this opportunity to draw attention
to the pollution-related damage and their health and safety
concerns.
The third stage is one where community-based regulation
fails to positively interact with state regulation. Here, the
interests of the state regulators and the local communities seem
to be far apart. By this stage, compensation and redress have
become an end in and of themselves, instead of a means. Even
though villagers know about the problems related to pollution
and worry about their health and safety, they do not translate
these concerns into effective action that would help reduce and
control such problems. An explanation for this attitude comes
from the combined legacies of the first and second stages, which
set out a controlled path for redress instead of regulation. The
third stage adds to this backdrop a community that is further
divided, where pollution has become habitual and softened by
new riches, new income has empowered a village leadership that
is strongly aligned with industrial interests, and an increasingly
active state regulator has failed to involve the local community.
A further explanation for why Baocun citizens have refrained
from taking steps to control and regulate such pollution is more
subtle and must be sought in the discursive frameworks that
have developed during the three stages.132

130. Id.
131. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62.
132. See Lora-Wainwright et al., supra note 49.
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COMMUNITY-BASED REGULATION AS A
MATTER OF FRAMING

A. The Role of Discursive Frameworks
By the third stage, community-based regulation is strongly
influenced by discursive frameworks that have evolved over the
years and which shape how villagers perceive pollution and
related courses of action. In the many conversations we had with
villagers, we found that in their analysis of pollution, health, and
development as well as the possibility for action against
pollution-related damage, villagers used certain discursive
frameworks. These frameworks have evolved gradually and are
shaped by past experiences with the industrial complex, local and
state leaders, and the growing interdependencies between
themselves and industry. We have discerned three frameworks:
the development frame, the pessimist frame, and the
compensation frame. Together, these frames have internalized
the experiences of pollution and activism, shaping the way
villagers view pollution and possible courses of action against it.
B. The Development Frame
The development frame, as we call it, is a discursive
framework that links industrial pollution to development,
creating the notion that you cannot have one without the other,
and that in order to get richer, pollution is inevitable. We saw
this frame in many of the conversations we had, not only with
villagers but also with the village leaders and the township cadre.
Consider the following quotes. Vice Township Secretary Li stated,
“Pollution is a necessary price of the stage of industrial
development.
Only if we develop first can we discuss
environmental protection later.”133 Similarly, Village Leader Wu
commented, “If there is no pollution, where will development

133. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Jianyuan Wang with Vice
Township Secretary, in Baocun, China (Apr. 21, 2009) (interview transcript on
file with author).
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come from?”134 His subordinate, Tacun, sub-village chief Li,
stated similarly: Tacun village head for instance told us pollution
is a necessary part of development. Villagers expressed similar
views. As one villager stated, “The environment is better now but
it will get worse again, the hills have all been sold, the water is
polluted, the air cannot get better either unless Linchang factory
closes. But then there will be no work, no chance to earn
money.”135 Similarly, a villager said in one interview, “Tazu is a
good place, only because we have the Linchang factory here . . .
To have this factory brings good and bad.”136 Many people
repeated that development brings both good (income) and bad
(pollution and related damage and even diseases). One even went
so far as stating, “without disease there is not such good economic
development.”137 It seems that with the increasing income
derived from the industrial complex, a discursive framework has
developed to deal with the negative effects of the local industry.
This framework helps villagers, and their leaders, to rationalize
and even accept pollution as an inevitable by-product of
development. It provides an unnecessarily dichotomized view of
industrial production; it either exists and causes pollution or it
does not exist and there is no development or pollution. This
view was clearly expressed by one villager, responding to whether
the air quality could be improved: “Impossible, it cannot. It only
could if Linchang collapsed (kuadiao), but then there would be no
more work and no more money. If the air would be clean again, it
would be hard for us to make money.”138 The reality is more
subtle and positive, however, as factories can decrease their
pollution if regulatory controls are effective. The development
frame makes pollution inevitable and thus precludes claims to

134. Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang & Jianyuan Wang with Village
Leader, in Baocun, China (Apr. 24, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
135. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Middle Aged Female
Villager, in Baocun, China (19 May, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
136. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Elder Male Owner of
Majiang Hall, in Baocun, China (May 18, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
137. Id.
138. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 99.
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decrease or control pollution. As such, it fits nicely with the
compensation- and redress-oriented forms of community-based
regulation that have developed.
C. The Pessimist Frame
The pessimist frame has arisen from a cocktail of pessimism
and passivism about what can be done about pollution. Many of
the responses to our questions on what to do about the pollutionrelated grievances were framed in terms of the impossible rather
than the possible. People used terms like meibanfa (it is
impossible),139 pointing at the strength of the companies and
their own weakness. As one villager stated, “We can only live
with it (zhi neng aizhe), how can we small folk (xiao laobaixing)
overcome a big enterprise like Linchang, especially now that the
state strongly supports industrial development?”140 Another
said, “Taking action is useless. This is a large state-owned
company, and the township government will protect it for the tax
income it pays, and will not let the people protest.”141 As one
other put it, “What can we do about it? Nobody asks you to live in
this village.”142 We also noted that many interviewees responded
to our question – asking what can be done – by stating that one
can “get a little compensation.”143 None expressed that pollution
139. Interview with Middle-aged Female Villager, supra note 62; Interview
with Elder Male Retired Worker, supra note 62; Interview with Middle-aged
Male Worker, supra note 109; Interview with Niece of Village Leader and Male
Owner of Majiang Hall, supra note 118; Interview with Female Local Market
Salesperson, supra note 104.
140. Interview by Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang with Accountant of Baita Subvillage, in Baocun, China (Apr. 29, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
141. Interview with Niece of Village Leader and Male Owner of Majiang Hall,
supra note 118.
142. Interview with Female Local Market Salesperson, supra note 104.
143. See e.g., Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang, and Anna Lora
Wainwright, with Middle Aged Male Villager in Baocun, China (May 3, 2009)
(interview transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu and Yiyun
Zhang with Middle Aged Male Villager in Baocun, China (Apr. 25, 2009)
(interview transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun
Zhang, and Anna Lora Wainwright, with Niece of Village Leader in Baocun,
China (May 4, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author); Interview by
Yunmei Wu & Yiyun Zhang, with Tacun subvillage chief Li, in Baocun, China
(Apr. 29, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author). The Tacun village
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could be addressed or that action could be taken to control it and
prevent damage from occurring. This pessimism is combined
with a sense of a lack of responsibility; many answered our
questions about who should solve pollution-related problems by
referring to the leaders (dangguande), which can mean those in
the village, the factory, or the state. It indicates that others –
those in power – should deal with these issues and that villagers
are powerless. This attitude is not surprising given the legacy of
the past: complete exclusion of citizen participation in these
matters in the planned economy, a very restricted role learned
through years of activism, and exclusion from compensation
negotiations in the second phase. The thought itself, however,
also steers their current and future action. It marks a belief that
nothing can change, action is ineffective, and the best thing they
can get is a little money, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
D. The Compensation Frame
The third discursive framework shaping community
regulation is the compensation frame.
Following years of
responding to pollution by demanding and receiving
compensation, villagers have started to view pollution damage in
terms of its relevance for compensation. In response to our
questions about what can be done, many answered that they can
get some compensation. In addition, when asked how the
situation can finally be solved, villagers often referred to
compensation. Even when asked what the ultimate solution to
the problems was, they never replied that pollution should be
controlled or that the most polluting parts of the factories should
be closed. Instead, they answered that the ultimate solution
would be compensation so they could relocate.144 We have seen
head for instance told us pollution is a necessary part of development (Apr. 29,
2009).
144. See e.g., Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang, and Anna Lora
Wainwright, with Middle Aged Female Villager in Baocun, China (May 10,
2009) (interview transcript on file with author); Interview by Yunmei Wu, Yiyun
Zhang, and Anna Lora Wainwright, with Niece of Village Leader in Baocun,
China (May 10, 2009) (interview transcript on file with author); Interview by
Yunmei Wu, Yiyun Zhang, and Anna Lora Wainwright, with Elder Male
Villager in Baocun, China (May 11, 2009) (interview transcript on file with
author).
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that industry and local leaders have used this framework to
control citizen activism and to keep it within the confines of
redress-related claims, which preclude regulation of pollution. In
instances where villagers expressed worries about their health
and safety, the factory and local leaders reframed their worries in
terms of redress and compensation. For instance, after the 2008
explosion, villagers worried about their safety and demanded to
be relocated, which they saw as the only way to finally solve the
matter. The factory responded by ignoring their demands,
stressing that if they got evidence of damage they could bring it
up again, thus reframing their demands in compensatory terms
which did not address the people’s concerns about future health
hazards. Similarly, health concerns and related claims for checkups have been responded to, time and again, by being ignored or
refused and always matched by a little payment. This seems to
have been effective. When asked why another village did get
medical check-ups, one of the leading local activists explained,
“The pollution in that village is limited, and they do not get
pollution compensation any more. If Tazu gets health check-ups
but no pollution compensation, that is not worth it; we no longer
get money.”145
Therefore, experiences with compensation and related
collective action that originally developed in the second stage and
continued in the third stage become set in frameworks that stress
redress instead of regulation. These frameworks resonate well
with a socio-economic context of dependence on industrial sources
of income and a political climate of co-optation, opportunism, and
control.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE COMPENSATION TRAP
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

This study has analyzed a particular, localized pattern of
community-based pollution regulation. It differs greatly from
forms of community regulation studied in the existing literature,
which have largely looked at non-localized forms of action
involving media, government authorities, and legal measures. As

145. Interview with Niece of Village Leader, supra note 92.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/2
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we have analyzed elsewhere, the existing studies and data
available so far have shown that Chinese citizens have gone to
court, complained to the authorities, and protested outside their
locality, with varying degrees of success in terms of compensation
and sometimes even pollution control.146 This article provides a
unique view of what happens in cases where data has not yet
been accessible, simply because citizens never reached the media,
courts, or government bureaus.
In the localized pattern studied here, citizens have become
caught in a compensation trap. Compensation, for land usage
and for pollution-related damage, has become an overarching end
that influences means that could normally be used for
community-based regulation. As pollution damage continues,
grievances and demands are shaped by compensation. This
means that citizen demands will only be made for damage where
redress is possible and for which there is a level of certainty and
hard evidence. It also means that the demands themselves
emphasize redress and not control or prevention of pollution.
Action organized in the village is also strictly aligned with the
search for compensation. Collective action like blockades has
supported leadership negotiations for pollution redress payments,
while action that involves outside support from the state, media,
or civil society has been less prevalent, as it is considered to
negatively affect compensation payment. Meanwhile, pollution
compensation payments are relatively small and are not directly
calculated based on the actual damage that citizens incur. They
especially do not involve damage where the linkage to pollution is
not certain or damage that may occur in the future, such as
health-related issues. When asked, villagers responded that the
compensation paid indeed does not make up for the damage they
have incurred. Their acquiescence is understandable given the
evolution of community-based regulation. The compensation
payment is small, and it seems to have a very limited regulatory
effect on the local industries that know they must pay every now
and then to keep the villagers quiet. Here, the compensation
agreements and the collective activism lack a clear normative
function; we have received little to no indication that norms were

146. See van Rooij, supra note 25, at 65-67.

41

742

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

invoked regarding what the factories are allowed or prohibited to
emit. Quite to the contrary, compensation payments have become
a license to pollute. For example, any normative elements are
hidden by framing compensation contracts in terms of agriculture
instead of pollution. Meanwhile, a view has started to develop in
which villagers are tied to compensation in such a way that they
are no longer seen as the victims of pollution. Rather, they are
seen as greedy opportunists who will try everything possible to
get more money from the industrial complex in their midst.
Thus, the compensation trap springs shut.
There are several interrelated explanatory factors for this
failure. The first one is the legacy of a planned economy in which
villagers had only limited citizenship and where the state and
collective industry compensated voluntarily, without being
pressed by the local community or even the state. Second, the
processes of industrialization have not only caused the pollution
that the community has been unable to control but have also
created a stratification that divided the pollution victims and
established a web of interdependencies between the villagers,
migrants, the industrial complex, the state, and the village
leaders. Third, the community’s capacities are limited; the
villagers lack financial independence, pollution-related expertise,
cohesion, and activist leadership. Here also the imbalance
between their income and that of the factory has made strong
bargaining difficult. The fourth factor is the role played by the
local village leadership, which has made use of its intermediary
position between the village and the industry to enrich the
villagers and themselves while controlling acts that could
endanger the newly acquired riches or their own position. Here,
the village leaders have been influenced by both the local
factories and the state. The fifth factor, then, is the role of the
state: local governments protecting their tax base and preventing
social unrest and environmental authorities failing to align the
community to regulate pollution. Here, national policy and law
are involved. Years of emphasizing development at the cost of the
environment in national policy clearly play out in the locality’s
short industrial history. National legislation has strengthened
the idea of compensation, by developing rights to compensation
for directly affected victims instead of more broadly framed
environmental rights or courses of action open to other civil

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/2
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society organizations that are less likely to become caught in a
local compensation trap. Sixth, there are the development,
pessimist, and compensation frameworks that have resulted from
all of this and that influence and control grievance and action
development.
In this pattern of localized pollution regulation, unless
community claims for compensation become sufficiently great to
have a regulatory effect or communities make claims that go
beyond redress (even payment for relocation) or engage
successfully with regulatory agencies, communities are unlikely
to have much impact on the environmental performance of
factories in their midst. The pattern studied here is of course not
representative of all forms of community-based pollution
regulation. We know from existing studies based on publicly
available data that there are many cases where citizens have
issued complaints to local authorities, where they have gone to
court, and sometimes have been able to get some compensation.
Until now, we had limited knowledge about what happened in
cases that were not made public in the media and in cases where
activism is restricted to the locality. Nor do we know much about
the long-term regulatory effect, even in cases where citizens won
compensation in court.
Through inference we can hypothesize that in China, or
countries with similar political and economic settings, many
rural, industrializing communities may share similar issues
obstructing
effective
community-based
regulation:
industrialization in developing countries may often have started
in the context of a planned economy and authoritarian regime,
with poor and uneducated villagers and a state that protects
industry. The question is whether the community develops
interdependencies with the industry and what formal or informal
local leaders the particular community has. The greater the
interdependencies, the greater seem the chances that community
leaders will become co-opted as they did in this study. When all
five factors discussed above are in place, it is likely that
controlling frameworks, similar to those studied here, will
ultimately develop to feed acquiescence and acceptance and will
obstruct community-based regulation of pollution.
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The interrelated nature of these explanatory factors marks
the resilience of the compensation trap and its obstacles to
effective community-based regulation. One can wonder what
could possibly produce a change.
It is unlikely that the
development of more rights by the state will translate into an
effect in the local community, given how they are set in the
existing frameworks and how small of a role the law has played
in their midst. Still, this article shows the importance of a
broader view of what rights must be enshrined in the law,
especially the right to a clean environment, apart from the
compensation-oriented norms targeted at pollution victims. It
also shows that there is a real need for allowing public interest
litigation by organizations that are not directly affected by the
pollution, including state and non-state organizations. There
have been many calls for such provisions in China,147 which until
now have remained without effect as legislators and key
stakeholders, including the courts, have halted the development
of such rights, amending legal drafts that included such
provisions.148 An understanding of the pattern studied here,
however, also leads to doubt about the effectiveness of such
provisions. It seems unlikely that any state or civic organization
will be able to use such rights, which cynically enough are
currently advocated by the local environmental court simply
because they lack information about the local pollution problems.
It seems that action must start from the local community. This
requires a belief that action involving outside actors is useful, and

147. Rachel Stern, Towards Environmental Public Interest Litigation?
Proposals for Legislative Change (prepared for the Natural Resource Defense
Council, 2008).
148. Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with Environmental Law Professor, in
Beijing, China (May 5, 2008) (interview transcript on file with author);
Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with Member of National People’s Congress
Legislative Affairs Commission, in Beijing, China (May 17, 2008) (interview
transcript on file with author); Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with
Environmental Law Professor, in Beijing, China (May 14, 2008) (interview
transcript on file with author); Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with
Environmental Lawyer, in Beijing, China (July 14, 2008) (interview transcript
on file with author); Interview by Benjamin van Rooij with Environmental Law
Professor, in Beijing, China (July 15, 2008) (interview transcript on file with
author).
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a belief that local problems ultimately require regulation, not just
compensation.
It seems the state environmental authorities will have a role
to play after all. Of all the external actors, they are the best
equipped to know the local situation and to initiate a change in
the local community.
Instead of regulating independently,
environmental authorities can involve the local villagers in every
step of their work. Agents can communicate about what they are
inspecting and compare their results with local knowledge in the
community. They can explain to what extent pollution is
inevitable and to what extent it can be further reduced and
controlled, thus trying to overcome the development discourse.
They can try to convince communities that their enforcement
action will not automatically shut down development and does
not preclude separate claims made by villagers for compensation.
As such, they can also get involved in compensation claims and
help villagers gather the evidence they need.
To conclude, it seems that the compensation trap may be
broken if state regulation directly engages with community-based
regulation, possibly also involving civil society organizations.
This stresses the relevance of Gunningham’s observation that
successful pollution regulation comes from a combination of state,
social, and economic forces.149 In the contexts studied here, such
a combination will not develop automatically and requires much
steering from the state regulators involved.

149. See GUNNINNGHAM ET AL., supra note 6.
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